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Abstract
This paper provides a rationale for intra-party democracy within a political agency
model with moral hazard. The focus is on the partys internal procedures for policy de-
termination. I show that democratizing those procedures benets the party leadership,
which seeks to maximize joint reelection chances of the partys incumbents. The reason is
that under intra-party democracy, the voters adopt less demanding reappointment rules
and reelect the partys incumbents more often than under leaders-dominated party struc-
ture. My results therefore indicate that democratizing policy determination processes
within the party is in the interests of both the leadership and the ordinary members. The
voters in turn are equally well o¤ regardless of the partys internal procedure for policy
determination.
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1. Introduction
Political parties have been recognized as essential to the e¢ cient and proper functioning of
democracy (see, for example, Schattschneider 1942, Duverger 1964, among many others). As
such, they are expected to organize public opinion by o¤ering voters choices at elections and
to provide enough cohesion to organize the work of legislative and executive branches. Since
much of policymaking takes place within the parties rather than in the public domain, it is
important to study the internal functioning of political parties. There has been, however,
less agreement about whether it is necessary for parties to organize themselves in internally
democratic ways (see Michels 1915, Kirchheimer 1966, Duverger 1964, Katz and Mair 2002).
But even if views still di¤er on the absolute necessity of intra-party democracy, most politi-
cal scientists agree that there are often sound and even self-interested reasons for parties to
adopt more open decision-making processes (see Teorell 1999, Scarrow 1999, 2005, Hazan and
Rahat 2010). This primarily refers to two main intra-party procedures: selecting party can-
didates and dening policy positions. The literature has provided several formal arguments
in favor of more democratic candidate selection methods, e.g., through primary elections (see
Meirowitz 2005, Jackson et al. 2007, Adams and Merrill 2008, Serra 2011, Castanheira et
al. 2012, among others). There is, however, no formal model, which provides a rationale for
implementing more inclusive policy determination processes within the party, to the best of
my knowledge. The present paper contributes to this line.
I formalize the partys internal policy determination procedure within a political agency
model with moral hazard. In my framework, implementing intra-party democracy results in
the partys best interest as the partys incumbents have greater chances of being reelected
under more inclusive policy-setting procedures.
I consider a political party in a legislature. The party leaders seek to maximize the joint
reelection chances of the partys incumbent congress members. Congress members a¢ liated
with the political party are assumed to be purely o¢ ce-motivated. They promote the interests
of their home districts, e.g., district-specic public policies or local public goods. The party
line (or party agenda) includes those district-specic policies, which are considered to be in
the interests of the entire party, and also species their relative importance for the partys
objectives. Only the policies included in the party line receive the party support on the oor of
the legislature, and so are more likely to be implemented. Policy outcomes are assumed to be
stochastic functions of the party support and therefore of corresponding policy weights. The
greater the policy weight in the party line, the more likely that policy is to be implemented.
The party leadership might adopt di¤erent internal procedures to determine the party
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line. Following Scarrow (2005), I distinguish between a party structure with low levels of
inclusiveness in decision-making processes (as in "leaders-dominated" parties, "parties of
notables" or "cadre" parties) and that with higher inclusiveness levels (as in parties of "indi-
vidual representation", "corporatist" parties, parties built on "basis democracy" or "mass"
parties). In the context of the policy determination model under consideration, this suggests
two options for the party internal structure. Under the rst, labeled as leadersdominance,
ordinary party members are excluded from the agenda-setting process. The party leadership
has the sole power to dene the party line. Under the second, labeled as intra-party democ-
racy, ordinary party members take part in setting the party line. They actually exert costly
e¤ort to bias the party agenda in favor of their preferred policies.
A representative voter in each district cares about implementation of a policy, which
benets his home district. Only the policy outcome is observed by the voter, not the corre-
sponding policy weight. The voter realizes that whoever denes the party line cares about the
incumbents reelection and therefore can be held accountable for the policy outcome at the
moment of election. I assume that the voter adopts a cuto¤ rule and reappoints the incum-
bent only when the corresponding policy outcome exceeds a critical threshold. Obviously,
the voter might nd it optimal to apply di¤erent thresholds for di¤erent internal structures
of the party.
Indeed, in equilibrium, the voter is extremely demanding in the case of leaders-dominated
party but much more tolerant in the case of intra-party democracy. Intuitively, the voter is
rational, and so realizes that adopting a very demanding reappointment rule might become
counterproductive under intra-party democracy. Indeed, the incumbents exert e¤orts to bias
the party line in favor of their preferred policies. The e¤ort is costly, and so might not
pay o¤ under very strict reappointment rules. Satisfying a very demanding voter actually
becomes too costly for his representative in the congress, which leads to lower e¤ort levels,
and therefore to smaller weight of the corresponding policy in the party line. The opposite is
true in the case of leaders-dominated party. In this case the policy weights are assigned by the
party leaders who care about the joint reelection chances of the partys incumbent congress
members. The voters therefore have a certain degree of power over the party leadershiptheir
wishes have to be satised at least to some extent to guarantee non-zero joint probability of
reappointment. The more demanding the voter in a particular district, the greater weight
the party leaders assign to a corresponding public policy to ensure at least some chance of
winning this district in the coming election.
While the voters apply di¤erent reappointment thresholds for di¤erent internal structures,
in equilibrium all policies are included in the party line with equal weights regardless of the
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party structure.1 Indeed, in the case of intra-party democracy, congress members exert equal
e¤orts to bias the party line in favor of their preferred policies, which results in equal policy
weights in equilibrium. In the case of leaders-dominated party, the party leadership tries
to satisfy somehow voterswishes in all districts to maximize the joint reelection chances of
the partys incumbents, and so nds it optimal to treat all the districts equally. Therefore,
whoever determines the party line, the voters are equally well o¤. However, the nal policy
outcomes are more likely to pass a tolerant threshold required for the incumbentsreappoint-
ment under intra-party democracy rather than a strict threshold required for reappointment
under leaders-dominated party structure. So the incumbent congress members have higher
chance of being reelected under intra-party democracy, which convinces the party leaders to
adopt more inclusive processes for setting the party agenda. Moreover, for the incumbents,
the costly e¤ort pays o¤: the net gain in reelection probability exceeds the e¤ort cost.
I must stress that these results rest on the assumption that party leaders care about joint
reelection chances of the partys incumbent congress members. If the party leaders pursue
other goals (e.g., particular policy or rent-seeking) they might prefer to have the sole authority
to determine the party line rather than adopt democratic decision-making procedures within
the party.
The paper borrows from the literature on political agency, starting with the seminal work
of Barro (1973) and followed by Ferejohn (1986), Persson et al. (1997), Austen-Smith and
Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1996), and others. In this approach, elections
are modeled as a disciplining device. Politicians want to be reelected for another term, and
are held accountable for their past performance at the time of election. They therefore have
incentives to satisfy the voterswishes.
The paper is also related to the broad literature on decision making in committees (see
Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998, Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, Persico 2004, Visser and
Swank 2007, Levy 2007, among many others). This literature emphasizes the impacts of
voting rules on decision making outcomes under various information structures and assump-
tions about agentspreferences. In contrast with these studies, I focus on the inclusiveness
of decision-making processes with emphasis on policy determination procedure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 proceeds with the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
1The results are symmetric owing to the symmetry of the problem. In subsection 3.3, I discuss the robust-
ness of the results to non-symmetric specications of the model.
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2. Model
Consider a political party that holds a certain number of seats in the congress. I assume, for
simplicity, that there are just two congress members a¢ liated with the political party.2 The
party leadership seeks to maximize the reelection chances of the partys incumbent congress
members (like in Fréchette et al. 2008). The party leadersobjective is therefore to maximize
the joint probability of partisan congress members being reelected to o¢ ce:
P
 \2i=1i ;
where P stands for probability and i denotes an event that the partys incumbent congress
member i is reelected, i = 1; 2.
Congress members a¢ liated with the political party are assumed to be purely o¢ ce-
motivated, and so maximize their own reelection chances. Congress member is objective
function is
P (i) :
Congress member i represents the interests of her home district i. Think of these as local
public goods or district-specic public projects. The party line (i.e., the party agenda)
species which of these district-specic public policies are in the interest of the party. I
formalize the party line in terms of weights si 2 [0; 1],
P2
i=1 si = 1. Weight si corresponds to
a public policy beneting partisan district i and reects the degree of priority of this policy
in the partys objectives. In extreme cases, si = 0 means that the corresponding policy is not
included in the party line, while si = 1 means that it is the partys only objective.
The party leadership might apply di¤erent internal procedures to dene the party line. In
particular, two opposite party structures are considered. Under the rst, labeled as leaders
dominance, the party leadership has the sole authority to determine the party line, and so
chooses weights si to maximize its objective function. In this case, ordinary party members
have no power to a¤ect the party agenda. Under the second, labeled as intra-party democracy,
ordinary party members have a say in dening the party line. They actually compete to bias
the partys objectives in favor of policies, which benet their home districts. This competition
is formalized in terms of the Tullock contest (1980) such that weight si, which corresponds
2An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the number of congress members
a¢ liated with the political party is left unspecied and general. The results of this extended model are
qualitatively similar.
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to public policy i in the party line, becomes
si (x1; x2) =
8<:
xiP2
j=1 xj
if max fx1; x2g > 0,
1
2 otherwise,
where xi denotes an e¤ort congress member i exerts to inuence the party line in favor of
a public policy beneting her home district. The set of e¤orts available to each congress
member is taken to be a non-degenerate interval [0; x]  R where x is large. The cost of the
e¤ort of congress member i is linear, xi.3
To pass a district-specic public policy in the congress, the party support is to be ensured.
Indeed, the more the party members support a particular policy on the oor of the legislature,
the more likely this policy is to pass the congress and then to be implemented.4 I assume
that the party support is guaranteed for the policies included in the party line. Moreover,
a policy with weight si in the party line is assumed to obtain the party support of strength
si.5 Then implementation of policy pi, which benets district i only, is determined by the
partisan support strength si and an independent, unobservable noise "i:
pi = s

i + "i,
where  2 (0; 1) and "i  N
 
0; 2

.6 The noise term "i is meant to represent all other factors
apart from the partisan support, which a¤ect passage and implementation of a district-specic
public project.7
Consider now a representative voter in district i, who cares about the implementation of
district-specic public policy pi.8 Only the policy outcome pi is observed by the voter, not its
3The qualitative results of the model hold for a convex cost function. A linear cost function is introduced
in order to simplify the algebra.
4 It is important to point out that success of a particular policy in the legislature is not solely determined
by legislative support of members of the corresponding party, but also the congress composition by party
and voting patterns of other congress members. I want to concentrate, however, on intra-party rather than
inter-party politics, and so focus the model on the partys internal functioning.
5 I therefore disregard di¢ culties the party leadership might face while getting the partys congress members
to support the party line. The literature on party discipline and cohesion addresses this issue (see, for example,
Colomer 2005, Diermeier and Feddersen 1998a, 1998b, Eguia 2011, Iaryczower 2008, McGillivray 1997, Patty
2008, Volden and Bergman 2006, among many others).
6The qualitative results of the model hold for a general concave function from si to pi. I introduce a
functional form pi = si + "i with  2 (0; 1) as it allows a closed-form solution.
7An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the noise term "i follows a single-peaked
symmetric distribution with increasing hazard function. The results of this extended model are qualitatively
similar.
8Since there is no ideological component, it is convenient to consider a single representative voter in each
district.
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composition between policy weight and noise. The voter realizes that whoever determines pis
weight in the party line (party leadership in the case of leaders-dominated party or congress
member i in the case of intra-party democracy) cares about is reelection chances, and so
can be held accountable for pis implementation at the moment of election. The voter is
assumed to adopt a cuto¤ reelection rule: he reappoints an incumbent congress member if
policy outcome pi exceeds a certain threshold, say i 2 [0; 1].9 Under this reelection rule,
event i that the partys incumbent congress member i is reelected becomes
i = fpi  ig = fsi + "i  ig :
The probability of i being reelected is given by
P (i) = P (fsi + "i  ig) = 1  F (i   si ) ;
where F denotes the normal distribution function. The joint probability of incumbent
congress members being reelected to o¢ ce becomes
P
 \2i=1i = P  \2i=1 fsi + "i  ig = (1  F (1   s1 )) (1  F (2   s2 )) :
This is a sequential political agency game between politicians (party leaders and congress
members) and representative voters (one in each partisan district). The timing of events is
as follows. First, the party leaders decide on the party internal structure: leadersdominance
or intra-party democracy. Second, the representative voter in each partisan district commits
to the reelection rule to be used in the coming election, i.e., chooses reelection threshold
i. Third, the party line is dened either by the party leaders (under leaders-dominated
party structure) or by the congress members in a competitive contest (under intra-party
democracy). Finally, nature chooses noises "1 and "2, and the policy outcomes p1 and p2 are
observed. The election takes place and the representative voter in each district applies the
selected reelection rule to reward the incumbent congress member.
I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game backwards. First, given
the party internal structure and reelection thresholds i 2 [0; 1], I examine the choice of
the party line. Second, given the party internal structure, I solve for the votersdecision
regarding reelection thresholds. Finally, I analyze the party leaders choice of the party
internal structure.
9The voter is rational, and so realizes that the expected policy outcome Epi will not exceed 1, i.e., Epi 2
[0; 1]. It is therefore reasonable to restrict is domain to [0; 1] too.
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3. Analysis
In this section, the game is analyzed backwards to nd a subgame perfect equilibrium. I
consider the politiciansand votersdecisions under leadersdominance rst, and under intra-
party democracy second. I turn then to the party leadersdecision regarding the party internal
structure.
3.1. Leaders-Dominated Party
Under leaders-dominated party structure, the party leaders have the sole authority to dene
the party line. Given the reelection rules with thresholds 1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1], the
party leadership chooses policy weights s1 and s2 in the party line to maximize its objective
function:
P
 \2i=1i = (1  F (1   s1 )) (1  F (2   s2 ))
with s1 + s2 = 1. The party leadersmaximization problem is analyzed in the Appendix. I
show that the second-order condition holds for all reelection rules with thresholds 1 2 [0; 1]
and 2 2 [0; 1] if variance 2 of the noise satises the condition 2 > 4(1 ) . In what follows,
I restrict the space of parameter values to satisfy 2 > 4(1 ) . Therefore, the equilibrium
policy weights in the case of leaders-dominated party, denoted by sL1 and s
L
2 = 1   sL1 ,
are implicitly characterized by the rst-order condition. The formal result is established in
Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
I turn now to the votersdecision regarding reelection thresholds 1 and 2. The rep-
resentative voter in district i chooses reelection threshold i 2 [0; 1] to maximize expected
policy outcome Epi =
 
sLi

. Then maximizing policy weights sL1 with respect to 1 and s
L
2
with respect to 2 yields equilibrium reelection thresholds 
L
1 and 
L
2 under leadersdomi-
nance. The results are summarized in the following proposition. (Proofs of this and other
propositions are given in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. In the case of leaders-dominated party, the representative voter in district
i uses the reelection rule with threshold Li = 1, i = 1; 2. The equilibrium policy weights,
denoted by si  sLi
 
L1 ; 
L
2

, are equal to one half: si =
1
2 . The joint probability of incumbent
congress members being reelected to o¢ ce under leadersdominance, denoted by PL
 \2i=1i,
is given by
PL
 \2i=1i = 1  F 1  12
2
:
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According to Proposition 1, under leaders-dominated party structure, the representative
voter in district i applies the strictest possible reelection threshold: Li = 1. Why does
the voter adopt such strict reelection rules? The voter is rational, and so realizes that the
party leaders have to satisfy his wishes, at least to some extent. Indeed, the party leadership
seeks to maximize the joint reelection chances of the partys incumbent congress members,
and so has to please a representative voter in each district somehow. Otherwise, the joint
probability of all congress members being reelected drops down sharply. The voters therefore
have a certain power over the party leadershipwhatever they demand has to be satised
to some extent to guarantee non-zero joint probability of reelection. Then, the stricter the
reelection rule in each district (i.e., the more demanding the voter), the greater weight the
party leaders assign to a corresponding policy in the party line to ensure at least some chance
of an incumbent being reelected in this district. The voter therefore tends to be as demanding
as possible. However, the party leadership is not able to satisfy all voters entirely. Indeed,
pleasing the voter in one district implies disappointing the voter in the other district. The
party leadership manages to nd a compromise, i.e., to satisfy both voters to some extent
ensuring some chances of both incumbents being reelected. In equilibrium, all public projects
are included in the party line with equal weights, s1 = s2 =
1
2 . (The policy weights are equal
owing to the symmetry of the problem.) The expected policy outcome in district i does not
reach the reelection threshold: Epi < 
L
i . As a result, the incumbent congress members are
more likely to be thrown out of o¢ ce. There is, however, some chance of both incumbents
getting reelected. This happens when a realization of noise "i is positive and su¢ ciently large
in each district, i.e., "i  Li   Epi for i = 1; 2. The probability of this is strictly less than
1
4 , and so is the probability of both incumbents being reelected under leadersdominance:
PL
 \2i=1i < 14 .
3.2. Intra-Party Democracy
In the case of intra-party democracy, congress members dene the party line in a competitive
contest. Each congress member exerts a costly e¤ort xi to inuence the party line in favor
of a public policy beneting her home district.10 Given the reelection rules with thresholds
i 2 [0; 1], congress member i chooses an e¤ort xi 2 [0; x] to maximize her reelection chances
net of the e¤ort cost:
P (i)  xi = 1  F (i   si )  xi = 1  F

i  

xi
xi + xj

  xi;
10Obviously, x1 = x2 = 0 is not an equilibrium. Indeed, each congress member would like to deviate and
exert a tiny e¤ort to make her favorite policy the partys only objective.
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where i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. The congress membersmaximization problem is analyzed in the
Appendix. I show that the second-order conditions hold for all reelection rules with thresh-
olds 1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1] if variance 2 of the noise satises the condition 2 > 4(1 ) ,
which was assumed to hold in the previous subsection. The congress membersbest response
functions are therefore characterized by the rst-order conditions. I then establish the ex-
istence of the congress membersequilibrium e¤orts xD1 and x
D
2 under the reelection rules
with thresholds 1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1] in the case of intra-party democracy. The result is
presented in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
I analyze now the voterschoice of reelection thresholds 1 and 2. Maximizing policy
weights sD1  x
D
1
xD1 +x
D
2
with respect to 1 and s
D
2  x
D
2
xD1 +x
D
2
with respect to 2 yields equilibrium
reelection thresholds D1 and 
D
2 under intra-party democracy. The results are presented in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the case of intra-party democracy, the representative voter in district i
uses the reelection rule with threshold Di =
1
2 , i = 1; 2. The congress membersequilibrium
e¤orts xi  xDi
 
D1 ; 
D
2

are equal to
xi =
p
221+
:
The equilibrium policy weights, denoted by si  sDi
 
D1 ; 
D
2

, are equal to one half: si =
1
2 .
The joint probability of incumbent congress members being reelected to o¢ ce under intra-
party democracy, denoted by PD
 \2i=1i, is given by
PD
 \2i=1i = 14 :
Under intra-party democracy, the voters are not so demanding as under leaders-dominated
party structure. Indeed, the equilibrium reelection rules are rather tolerant: Di =
1
2 < 1.
Intuitively, the voters goal is to motivate his representative in the congress to exert e¤ort to
bias the party line in favor of the voters preferred public project. If the voter is absolutely
not demanding and always reelects the incumbent, the latter has no incentive to work hard
in the congress. Then, the more demanding the voter (i.e., the stricter the reelection rules),
the more incentives the congress member has to promote the interests of her home district
and so the more e¤ort exerts. As a result, the corresponding public policy gets the greater
weight in the party line. However, the e¤ort is costly, and so might not pay o¤ under
very strict reappointment rules. Indeed, satisfying a very demanding voter becomes too
costly for his representative in the congress, which leads to lower e¤ort levels, and therefore
to smaller weight of the corresponding policy in the party line. It follows that the policy
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weight is initially increasing and then decreasing with a reelection threshold applied in the
corresponding district. The voter therefore adopts a reelection threshold of intermediate
value, which maximizes the weight of his preferred policy in the party line. Thus, under intra-
party democracy, the equilibrium reelection rules tend to be less strict than under leaders
dominance. The incumbents can meet the voterswishes in this case. In equilibrium, all public
projects are included in the party line with equal weights and the expected policy outcomes
reach the thresholds required for reelection in each district: Epi = Di . Each incumbent
therefore has equal chance of being reelected or thrown out of o¢ ce. A positive realization of
noise "i pushes the policy outcome over the required threshold and therefore implies reelection
of the incumbent. In turn, a negative realization of noise drags the policy outcome down and
leads to the incumbents dismissal. The joint probability of both incumbents being reelected,
PD
 \2i=1i, then equals 14 .
How do the equilibrium e¤orts xi depend on the values of the parameters? A larger
variance 2 of the noise decreases the congress memberse¤orts. Intuitively, more randomness
in the observed policy outcomes pi makes the reelection probabilities less sensitive to e¤ort,
reducing the congress membersincentives. In turn, a larger concavity parameter  increases
the congress members e¤orts. Indeed, a larger  makes the relationship between policy
outcome pi and corresponding policy weight si more linear (and less concave). As a result, the
reelection probabilities become more sensitive to e¤ort, increasing the incumbentsincentives.
3.3. Choice of the Party Internal Structure
I turn now to the leaderschoice of the party internal structure. The party leadership seeks
to maximize the joint reelection chances of the partys incumbent congress members. The
joint probability of the incumbents being reelected is higher under intra-party democracy
than under leadersdominance:
PD
 \2i=1i = 14 > PL  \2i=1i ;
which drives the following result.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium internal procedure to dene the party line is intra-party
democracy. The equilibrium reelection thresholds, congress members e¤orts and policy
weights are given in Proposition 2.
At rst glance this result seems counterintuitive. Indeed, why would the party leaders
let ordinary members determine the party line instead of choosing it themselves? Intuitively,
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the party leaders realize that if they were the ones dening the party line, they would face
very demanding voters. The voter in each district would actually adopt the strictest possible
reelection rule to motivate the party leaders to make his preferred policy the partys only
objective. And the party leaders in this case would have to meet the votersrequirements
somehow, in order to guarantee some positive chances of the incumbents being reelected in all
districts. However, none of the voters could be completely satised as all public policies would
be included in the party line with equal weights. As a result, the incumbent congress members
would be more likely to be thrown out of o¢ ce rather than reelected. The party leaders
therefore prefer to let ordinary members dene the party line in a competitive contest, as in
this case each congress member has equal chance of being reelected or dismissed. Intuitively,
the voters realize that biasing the party line in favor of their preferred policies is costly for the
incumbents and might not pay o¤ under very demanding reappointment rules. As a result,
the voters are quite tolerant. Satisfying their realistic demands is feasible. In equilibrium,
the incumbents exert equal e¤orts, and so all policies have equal weights in the party line
and get equal support on the oor of the legislature. The expected policy outcomes reach
the thresholds required for reappointment. The reelection outcome for each incumbent is
therefore determined solely by a realization of the noise, and so has equal chance of being
favorable or unfavorable. The incumbents are thus more likely to be reelected under intra-
party democracy than under leaders-dominated party structure. Moreover, their costly e¤orts
nally pay o¤. Indeed, the incumbents are better o¤ exerting costly e¤orts to determine the
party line in a competitive contest under intra-party democracy rather than just accepting
the agenda of the party leadership under leadersdominance:
PD (i)  xi > PL (i) (3.1)
for the range of parameters of interest, i.e., for 2 > 4(1 ) with  2 (0; 1). (The proof of
this is given in the Appendix.) I must stress that whoever determines the party line (party
leadership in the case of leaders-dominated party or congress members in the case of intra-
party democracy) assigns the same policy weights in equilibrium. The di¤erence between the
two internal procedures is in the equilibrium reappointment rules adopted by the voters, which
a¤ect the incumbentsreelection probabilities. So the ordinary party members are better o¤
under intra-party democracy not because of better policy outcomes but just because of less
demanding voters. The voters in turn are equally well o¤ regardless of the internal procedure
for dening the party line. Indeed, whoever determines the party line, each policy gets the
same weight and the same party support:
si = s

i =
1
2
:
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The results presented here are symmetric owing to the symmetry of the problem. The
model can be extended to consider agents with non-symmetric preferences and/or cost func-
tions, or to assume non-symmetric relationships between policy weights and corresponding
policy outcomes. Such extended model would obviously yield non-symmetric solutions for
equilibrium policy weights and reelection thresholds. However, the voters would still be less
demandingand so more likely to reelect incumbentsunder intra-party democracy than un-
der leadersdominance. The main message of the paper would therefore hold unless the party
leaders were assumed to pursue other goals or favor a particular public policy rather than to
maximize a joint probability of partisan congress members being reelected to o¢ ce. Indeed,
if it were the case, the party leadership would not have to satisfy a representative voter in
each district under leaders-dominated party structure.
4. Conclusion
This paper has provided a rationale for intra-party democracy within a political agency model
with moral hazard. I focus on policy determination procedures within the party and show
that democratizing those is in the partys interest. The reason is that under intra-party
democracy, the voters adopt less strict reappointment rules and reelect the incumbents more
often than under leaders-dominated party structure. The voters realize that very demand-
ing reappointment rules become counterproductive under intra-party democracy, when the
congress members exert costly e¤orts to bias the party line in favor of their home districts.
Very strict reappointment requirements demotivate the incumbents to make e¤ort in this
case. In contrast, under leaders-dominated party structure, whatever reelection requirements
the voters apply will be met to some extent since the party leadership wants to guarantee
positive reelection chances of the partys incumbents in all partisan districts. The stricter the
reappointment rules in a particular district in this case, the more weight the party leaders
assign to the corresponding policy in the party line. Intuitively, the voters then adopt more
demanding reappointment rules under leadersdominance.
I must point out that the paper constitutes a partial attempt to justify intra-party democ-
racy and focuses on a specic game within a political agency framework. It would be of
interest to explore di¤erent game structures that might reveal further reasons for political
parties to adopt more inclusive policy determination processes.
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Appendix
A. Party LeadersMaximization Problem under Leaders-Dominated Party
Structure
Given reelection thresholds 1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1], the party leaders assign policy weight
s1 to maximize
P
 \2i=1i = (1  F (1   s1 )) (1  F (2   (1  s1))) :
The rst-order condition with respect to s1 is
s 11 f (1   s1 ) (1  F (2   (1  s1))) (1  s1) 1 f (2   (1  s1)) (1  F (1   s1 )) = 0;
(A.1)
where f denotes the normal probability density function. The second-order condition is
s 21 f (1   s1 ) (1  F (2   (1  s1)))

  1  s1
f 0 (1   s1 )
f (1   s1 )

+
(1  s1) 2 f (2   (1  s1)) (1  F (1   s1 ))

  1   (1  s1) f
0 (2   (1  s1))
f (2   (1  s1))

 
2s 11 (1  s1) 1 f (1   s1 ) f (2   (1  s1)) < 0: (A.2)
The last term of (A.2) is negative. The signs of the rst and second terms are exclusively
determined by the signs of
  1  s1
f 0 (1   s1 )
f (1   s1 )
=   1 + 
2
s1 (1   s1 ) (A.3)
and
  1   (1  s1) f
0 (2   (1  s1))
f (2   (1  s1))
=   1 + 
2
(1  s1) (2   (1  s1)) ; (A.4)
respectively. Given s1 2 [0; 1] and 1 2 [0; 1], the maximum of (A.3) is equal to    1 +

42
, which is negative for 2 > 4(1 ) . Accordingly, given s1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1], the
maximum of (A.4) is equal to   1 + 
42
, which is negative for 2 > 4(1 ) . I then restrict
the space of parameter values to satisfy the condition 2 > 4(1 ) to guarantee that the
second-order condition (A.2) holds for all s1 2 [0; 1], 1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1]. The rst-
order condition (A.1) therefore characterizes the equilibrium policy weights under leaders
dominance, denoted by sL1 and s
L
2 = 1   sL1 . The results are summarized in the following
lemma.
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Lemma 1. Under leaders-dominated party structure, given the reelection rules with thresh-
olds 1 2 [0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1], the party leaders assign policy weights sL1 and sL2 = 1   sL1 ,
which are implicitly characterized by the rst-order condition (A.1).
Simplifying (A.1) yields an implicit solution for the party leadersmaximization problem:
sL1 =
0@ 1  F  1    sL1 
f
 
1  
 
sL1
 f  2    1  sL1 
1  F  2    1  sL1 
! 1
1 
+ 1
1A 1 : (A.5)
B. Proof of Proposition 1
The representative voter in district 1 chooses 1 2 [0; 1] to maximize sL1 , which satises (A.5).
The voter then chooses 1 to maximize hazard function
f(1 (sL1 )

)
1 F(1 (sL1 )

)
since sL1 strictly in-
creases with
f(1 (sL1 )

)
1 F(1 (sL1 )

)
for any 2 2 [0; 1]. The hazard function of the normal distribu-
tion is increasing, i.e., ddy

f(y)
1 F (y)

> 0. The voter therefore assigns 1 2 [0; 1] to maximize
1  
 
sL1

, i.e., L1 = 1, where 
L
i denotes a reelection threshold in district i under leaders
dominance.
By analogy, the representative voter in district 2 chooses 2 2 [0; 1] to maximize sL2 =
1   sL1 , where sL1 satises (A.5). The voter then chooses 2 to maximize hazard function
f(2 (1 sL1 )

)
1 F(2 (1 sL1 )

)
as sL2 = 1   sL1 strictly increases with
f(2 (1 sL1 )

)
1 F(2 (1 sL1 )

)
for any 1 2 [0; 1].
Since for the normal distribution ddy

f(y)
1 F (y)

> 0, the voter in district 2 chooses L2 = 1,
which maximizes 2  
 
1  sL1

.
Plugging L1 = 1 and 
L
2 = 1 in (A.5) yields an implicit solution for the equilibrium policy
weights in the case of leaders-dominated party, denoted by s1 and s2 = 1  s1:
s1 =
 
1  F (1  (s1))
f (1  (s1))
f (1  (1  s1))
1  F (1  (1  s1))
 1
1 
+ 1
! 1
: (B.1)
Solving (B.1) for s1 2 [0; 1] yields a unique equilibrium s1 = 12 , s2 = 12 . I prove this
by contradiction. Indeed, if s1 >
1
2 then 1   (1  s1) > 1   (s1), which implies that
f(1 (1 s1)

)
1 F(1 (1 s1)

)
>
f(1 (s1)

)
1 F(1 (s1)

)
since the hazard function of the normal distribution is in-
creasing. Then the right-hand side of (B.1) is inferior to 12 for all  2 (0; 1), which means
that s1 <
1
2 and contradicts the initial assumption s

1 >
1
2 . So the initial assumption s

1 >
1
2
must be false. Assume now that s1 <
1
2 . Then, by analogy, one can show that the right-
hand side of (B.1) is superior to 12 for all  2 (0; 1), which contradicts s1 < 12 . It follows
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then that the assumption s1 <
1
2 must be false, and s

1 =
1
2 , s

2 =
1
2 are the equilibrium
policy weights under leaders-dominated party structure. The joint probability of incumbent
congress members being reelected to o¢ ce, denoted by PL
 \2i=1i, is equal to
PL
 \2i=1i =  1  F  L1   (s1)  1  F  L2   (s2) = 1  F 1  12
2
:
C. Congress MembersMaximization Problem under Intra-Party Democ-
racy
Given reelection threshold i 2 [0; 1], congress member i exerts e¤ort xi to maximize
P (i)  xi = 1  F

i  

xi
xi + xj

  xi:
The rst-order condition with respect to xi is
f

i  

xi
xi + xj
 xi
xi + xj
 1 xj
(xi + xj)
2   1 = 0: (C.1)
The second-order condition is
f

i  

xi
xi + xj
 xi
xi + xj
 2 x2j
(xi + xj)
4
0@  1   xi
xi + xj
 f 0 i    xixi+xj 
f

i  

xi
xi+xj

1A 
2

xi
xi + xj
 1 xj
(xi + xj)
3 f

i  

xi
xi + xj

< 0: (C.2)
The last term of (C.2) is negative. The sign of the rst term is exclusively determined by the
sign of
  1  

xi
xi + xj
 f 0 i    xixi+xj 
f

i  

xi
xi+xj
 =   1 + 2

xi
xi + xj

i  

xi
xi + xj

:
(C.3)
Given i 2 [0; 1] and xi; xj 2 [0; x] such that max fxi; xjg > 0, the maximum of (C.3) is equal
to   1+ 
42
, which is negative for 2 > 4(1 ) . Therefore the second-order condition (C.2)
holds for all i 2 [0; 1] and xi; xj 2 [0; x] such that max fxi; xjg > 0.
The assumption that the upper bound of the set of e¤orts, x, is large guarantees that the
best response functions are characterized by the rst-order conditions (C.1). The congress
membersbest response functions are continuous functions from [0; x] into itself, where [0; x]
is a nonempty, compact, convex set. The standard existence results can therefore be applied
to establish the following lemma.
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Lemma 2. Under intra-party democracy, given the reelection rules with thresholds 1 2
[0; 1] and 2 2 [0; 1], there exists an equilibrium prole
 
xD1 ; x
D
2

characterized by the rst-
order conditions (C.1).
Dividing the rst-order condition of congress member js problem by that of congress
member is problem and simplifying yields
xDj
xDi
=
0BB@f

j  

xDj
xDi +x
D
j

f

i  

xDi
xDi +x
D
j

1CCA
1
2 
: (C.4)
D. Proof of Proposition 2
The representative voter in district i chooses i 2 [0; 1] to maximize policy weight sDi 
xDi
xDi +x
D
j
, where xDi and x
D
j satisfy (C.4), i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j:
sDi =
 
xDj
xDi
+ 1
! 1
=
0B@
0@f

j  

sDj

f
 
i  
 
sDi

1A
1
2 
+ 1
1CA
 1
: (D.1)
The voter then chooses i to maximize density function f
 
i  
 
sDi

since sDi strictly
increases with f
 
i  
 
sDi

for any j 2 [0; 1]. The normal probability density function is
maximized in its mean, i.e., in 0. The voter therefore chooses
Di =
 
sDi

; (D.2)
where Di denotes a reelection threshold in district i under intra-party democracy. Substi-
tuting (D.2) into (D.1) yields the equilibrium policy weights under intra-party democracy,
denoted by si :
si  sDi
 
Di ; 
D
j

=
 
f (0)
f (0)
 1
2 
+ 1
! 1
=
1
2
:
The equilibrium reelection threshold therefore becomes
Di =
1
2
:
The joint probability of incumbent congress members being reelected to o¢ ce, denoted by
PD
 \2i=1i, is equal to
PD
 \2i=1i =  1  F  D1   (s1 )  1  F  D2   (s2 ) = (1  F (0))2 = 14 :
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Substituting equilibrium thresholds Di into the rst-order conditions (C.1) yields congress
membersequilibrium e¤orts under intra-party democracy, denoted by xi , i = 1; 2:
xi  xDi
 
D1 ; 
D
2

=
p
221+
:
Finally, the participation constraints of the congress members are satised: 12   xi  0 for
2 > 4(1 ) .
E. Proof of (3.1)
In the case of intra-party democracy, the incumbents utility is given by her reelection prob-
ability net of e¤ort cost:
PD (i)  xi =
1
2
  p
221+
:
In the case of leaders-dominated party, the incumbents utility is just her reelection proba-
bility:
PL (i) = 1  F

1  1
2

:
I consider the di¤erence between the two and show that it is strictly positive for the range
of parameters of interest, i.e., for 2 > 4(1 ) with  2 (0; 1). Indeed,
PD (i)  xi   PL (i) =  
1
2
  p
221+
+ F

1  1
2

;
which is a continuous function of . Derivating with respect to  yields
@
@
(PD (i)  xi   PL (i)) =
1p
221+
 
 1 +  ln 2 + e 
(1  12 )
2
22 ln 4
!
;
which is strictly positive for 2 > 4(1 ) with  2 (0; 1). Moreover, evaluating PD (i)  
xi   PL (i) in  = 0 yields 0. It follows that for any  from the range of parameters
of interest, PD (i)   xi   PL (i) increases with  and takes the value of 0 for  = 0.
Therefore,
PD (i)  xi   PL (i) > 0
for  2 (0; 1) and 2 > 4(1 ) .
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